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ABSTRACT This article argues that the vernacular of development, as deployed in and about African communities,
is a racial vernacular. It is a racial vernacular of development because it is deployed within, in this case, the resource
extraction industry (as well as within the broader development enterprise) in ways that sustain racial thought,
index particular racial meanings, and prescribe social practices. How do we understand the processes through
which racial codes are embedded and naturalized in practices ranging from the management and bureaucracy of
resource extractions to the power structure of the world system that places African sovereignty below Western
nongovernmental organizations and corporations? The development complex incorporates the unequal material
relationships and processes that structure engagement between the Global South and the Global North, and its
racial vernacular is the primary discursive scaffolding for these relationships. [development, race, resource extraction,
Ghana]
RESUMEN Este ensayo argumenta que la lengua verna´cula del desarrollo, como es utilizada en y acerca de
comunidades africanas, es una lengua verna´cula racial. Es una lengua verna´cula racial del desarrollo porque es
utilizada dentro, en este caso, la industria de extraccio´n de recursos (ası´ como dentro de la empresa ma´s amplia del
desarrollo) en formas que sostienen un pensamiento racial, cataloga significados raciales particulares, y prescribe
pra´cticas sociales. ¿Co´mo entendemos los procesos a trave´s de los cuales co´digos raciales esta´n embebidos y
naturalizados en pra´cticas que van desde la gestio´n y la burocracia de extracciones de recursos hasta la estructura
de poder del sistema mundial que coloca la soberanı´a africana por debajo de organizaciones no gubernamentales y
corporaciones occidentales? El complejo del desarrollo incorpora las relaciones materiales desiguales y los procesos
que estructuran la interaccio´n entre el Sur Global y el Norte Global, y su lengua verna´cula racial es el andamiaje
discursivo primario para estas relaciones. [desarrollo, raza, extraccio´n de recursos, Ghana]
I begin from a position of extreme distrust of language and do
not believe that English—or any European language, for that
matter—can truly speak our truths without the language in ques-
tion being put through some sort of transformative process. A
decontaminating process is probably more accurate, since a lan-
guage as deeply implicated in imperialism as English has been
cannot but be contaminated by such a history and experience.
–M. NourbeSe Philip, “Interview with an Empire”1
It is reported that one of the first things the gov-
ernment of the Republic of Ghana did after large
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quantities of extractable offshore oil deposits were dis-
covered in 2007 was to apply for a five-year Norwegian
government Oil for Development (OfD) grant. The objec-
tive of the OfD agreement is for the Norwegian govern-
ment to help the Ghanaian government “reduce poverty
by promoting responsible management of petroleum
resources.”2 A promotional video made by the Norwe-
gian Agency for Development and Cooperation (NORAD)
touting its “Oil for Development: Cooperation between
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Ghana and Norway” program begins with the following
statement:
It doesn’t follow that the discovery of oil in the country auto-
matically leads to a better life for the people. On the contrary,
corruption, environmental damage, a heated-up economy and con-
flicts could mean that natural resources become more of a curse
than a blessing . . . . Norwegian expertise in the management of oil
resources is in much demand . . . . The Ghanaian authorities were
quick to get in touch with Norway for advice and cooperation.
(transcribed by author; emphasis added)3
In a similar vein, the World Bank in October 2012
launched a proposal to find funding for a new trust fund
to “help African countries negotiate the best-possible deals
for the oil, gas, and minerals.” The concept paper for this
fund states that “evidence suggests that the dependence on
extractive industries . . . will increase in the foreseeable
future, so there is an even greater urgency to promote prudent
managementof these valuable resources” (emphasis added).4 It
further argues that one of the key reasons benefits of mineral
wealth have not materialized for African governments and
their populations is “lack of government capacity to manage
the [contract] negotiations.” In ways similar to NORAD’s
OfD program, theWorld Bank solutions for Africans would
be to help them “build capacity” in the form of ongoing
technical, legal, and social scientific assistance.
That postcolonial African states’ projects of resource
extraction are framed through “development,” and its
current neoliberal orthodoxy of “good governance”
points to the ideological and practical entanglements of
resource-to-development practices that have emerged over
the past three decades. Similar to gold and other mineral
resources, oil extraction becomes a project occurring within
the framework of development and policy regimes that
undermine the Ghanaian state’s sovereignty and encourages
dependence on Western agencies. In this sense, whatever
the Ghanaian state’s potential for dealing with its own
natural resources quickly becomes absorbed within broader
claims of postcolonial Africa’s presumably inherent procliv-
ity to turn resource wealth into a “resource curse.”5 Thus,
the claims of theNorwegianOfD program forGhana depend
upon two presumptions: first, that there is something called
a “resource curse,” and Norway managed to avoid it; and
second, that Ghana cannot handle the management of its
resources without outside help, especially from Norway.
Indeed, consistent calls for African states, such as Ghana, to
pursue “good governance” and to enhance their “capacity”
(on a number of fronts) are not controversial among de-
velopment scholars and practitioners. This is because such
tropes of good governance or capacity building are familiar,
have become naturalized, and operate within the ideological
apparatus that governs the ways that international aid orga-
nizations, Western governments, and academics, including
anthropologists, engage contemporary resource extraction
and the overall idea of development in Africa.
My concern in this article is with the normalization of
particular vernaculars of development orthodoxy through
the current resource-to-development schemes. By “devel-
opment,” I mean the constellation of public and private
agencies and Western-funded nongovernmental organiza-
tions and institutions that are purportedly set up to bring
about economic, cultural, and political change in a given so-
ciety. “Development” is also the intellectual apparatus that
projects a particular ideological framework for producing
subjects and objects (Escobar 1995). I focus on some of the
terminology of development and the organization and or-
dering of these terms through what Eduardo Bonilla-Silva
(2012) calls a “racial grammar.” Bonilla-Silva explains racial
grammar in this way: “if racial ideology furnishes the ma-
terial that is spoken, argued, and transacted, racial gram-
mar provides the ‘deep structure,’ the ‘logic’ and ‘rules’ of
proper composition of racial statements . . . of what can be
seen, understood, and even felt about racial matters” (174).
My argument is that the English-language terms utilized in
resource-to-development schemes point to a racial vernac-
ular. I am calling this a racial vernacular of development
because it is deployed within the resource-extraction indus-
try (and within the broader development enterprise) in ways
that sustain racial thought, that index particular racial mean-
ings, and that prescribe certain social and political practices.
Anthropologists have demonstrated the interplay of race
and language, and the ways “colonial distinctions within
and between nation-state borders continue to shape con-
temporary linguistic and racial frontiers” (Rosa and Flores
2017, 623). In the context of the development apparatus
deployed in Africa, I contend that the “co-naturalization of
language and race” (623) that constructs Africans as peculiar
types of beings is evident through such terms as “capacity
building,” “corruption,” “resource curse,” and “(bad) gover-
nance,” among others. The terms reinforce patterns of racial
(dis)advantage, global inequality, and relations structured in
dominance.
There is, of course, a decades-old critique of the dis-
cursive practices of theWestern development apparatus as a
knowledge system that (re)produces colonialist ideas about
the “Third World” while marginalizing non-Western forms
of knowledge (Escobar 1995). In this article, however, I
focus on the racial articulations of this development appa-
ratus and its forms of knowledge production. In particular,
I argue that the terminology of development thrives on the
construction of a notion of fundamental African racial differ-
ence (and white Western normativity) while rendering the
unequal institutional and material relations of resource ex-
traction, among other things, through terms that sediment
cultural narratives of this presumed African inferiority. In a
context where race and racism are often ignored or assumed
to have little relevance in development, how do we under-
stand the processes throughwhich racial codes are embedded
and naturalized in practices ranging from contract negoti-
ations and the management and bureaucracy of resource
extractions to the power structure of the world system that
places African sovereignty below Western nongovernmental
organizations and corporations? The effort here, then, is to
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demonstrate the deeply racialized nature of the development
apparatus and to see its vernaculars as one of the tools of its
continuing racialization.
Inwhat follows, I show that the processes of racialization
that underpin the idea of development, development schol-
arship, and resource-to-development practice are based on
assumptions around African cultural peculiarity, the excep-
tionality of African political practice, andwhat political theo-
rist Siba Grovogui (2001) describes as the belief in “a general
African lack.” My objective is to extend the well-known
critiques of the development project as one of Othering to
stress the racial dimension of such Othering—especially in
the African context. I then examine three key terms from the
racial lexicon of development: “good governance,” “capacity
building,” and the descriptor “artisanal.” While this is by no
means an exhaustive representation of its racial vernaculars,
I want to demonstrate how such terms have been deployed
to not only structure the unequal and racialized relationship
between Africa and the West but also to obscure the role
of colonialism (and postcolonial hierarchies) in producing
global inequalities while rendering the structural and epis-
temological violence of the development industry routine
and commonsense. I end by briefly contextualizing how the
assumptions undergirding the racial terminology of devel-
opment continue to be a generalized process reflected in
anthropological engagement with Africa. I also want to note
that, while my discussion includes specific ethnographically
informed analysis from my ongoing research in Ghana, the
point is to demonstrate the ways that development’s racial
vernaculars implicate “Africa”—as trope and racialized en-
tity (see Pierre 2018). In this sense, the diversity of the
economic processes of various African nations is less impor-
tant than the ways that the racial vernaculars of development
continue to implicate the entire continent.
THE RACIAL LEGACY OF DEVELOPMENT
Anthropologist Uma Kothari (2006) once asked if devel-
opment can ever be “separated from a history that pro-
duced . . . ‘race.’” Race and development have been inti-
mately related since the consolidation of European power
over themajority of the world in the late eighteenth century.
In other words, it is important to understand development
as incorporating thewhole complex of unequal historical and
material relationships, processes, and related ideological and
discursive projects that structure engagement between the
West and the rest of the world. The project of development,
then, cannot be abstracted from the violent history of Eu-
ropean imperialism (conquest, slavery, genocide, and land
and resource expropriation) and the naturalization of this
violence through the trope of “civilization” claimed by the
West. Also built into this project is the racialization of the
West and its intellectual, political, and juridical traditions
and practices as white (Grovogui 2001).
There has emerged important scholarship that traces
the imbrication of race and development to the histories
of colonialism and capitalist imperialism (Grovogui 2001;
Kothari 2006; Manji and O’Coill 2002). Firoze Manji and
Carl O’Coill (2002) argue, for example, that contemporary
Western NGOs have assumed the “missionary position” of
early “volunteer associations” tied to colonial rule.When for-
mal colonialism ended, these volunteer associations joined
with post–World War II “war charities” and turned their
attention to “underdeveloped” postcolonial nations. In the
process, they shed their explicit racist discourse of the “white
man’s burden” for a new one of underdevelopment. Manji
and O’Coill write: “It was no longer that Africans were ‘un-
civilised.’ Instead, they were ‘underdeveloped.’ Either way,
the ‘civilised’ or ‘developed’ European has a role to play in
‘civilizing’ or ‘developing’ Africa” (Manji andO’Coill 2002,
7). Branwen Jones (2013, 61–62) also demonstrates that the
immediate predecessor to contemporary racialized discourse
of presumed African ineptitude is the “sanitized language of
development and modernization” that emerged in the wake
of decolonization. This was a discourse “evacuated of the
vocabulary of race” (62). Former colonial states could then
legitimize their ongoing hierarchical relations with former
colonies through the language of political, economic, and
social concern for new independent states, silencing the his-
tory of colonialism, which produced these inequalities in the
first place.
The new scholarship6 on race and development, echoing
the decades of marginalized anthropological scholarship on
racial formation (Allen and Jobson 2016; Harrison 1995),
reminds us that the terms of the “technical expert,” “consul-
tant,” “expatriate,” and even “anthropologist” are not race
neutral (Kothari 2006). Along with the banality of the racial-
ized images of aid/development recipients versus donors
and experts, these terms represent ideologies and practices
that obfuscate—even as they reveal and reproduce—the
racializing core of the development complex. At base, de-
velopment sets up a dichotomy of whiteness and nonwhite-
ness, which, while often implicit, nevertheless marks the
legacies of colonial methods of distinction. This occurs in
myriad forms, but for our purposes, it does so primarily
through the construction and maintenance of “whiteness and
the west [as] symbols of authority, expertise and knowl-
edge” and through a terminology that “masks the profound
material implications of ‘race’ in terms of its impact upon
the unequal distribution of resources that shape dynamics of
poverty and social exclusion” (Kothari 2006, 10). My own
earlier research inGhanamade clear the connection between
whiteness and development—in particular, the authoritative
power of whiteness within the context of aid, expertise, and
related understandings of civilization and growth (Pierre
2013). This reality is most aptly demonstrated in Nigerian
novelist Teju Cole’s (2012) essay “The White Savior Indus-
trial Complex,” where Cole laments the ways that too often
“a nobody from America or Europe can go to Africa and
become a godlike savior . . . under the banner of ‘making a
difference.’”
To acknowledge development’s enunciative context of
colonial domination and capitalist imperialism, therefore,
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is to understand the ways that development—and all its
processes and practices—is always already a racialized and
racializing project. Here, I follow the vast scholarship on
processes of race and racialization as demarcating structures
of power. Structurally, it matters little the intentions of
those who participate in the development project, for they,
we, are all interpellated into the global racial system (Rana
2011) and its white supremacist structures. Indeed, the key
funding institutions that maintain the development industry
(especially the ways that “Global North”7 institutions such
as the IMF and World Bank have forcefully empowered in-
ternational NGOs at the expense of receiving nation-states,
for example), the compromised role of postcolonial nation-
states that are being served, and the rank order and hierarchi-
cal power of personnel in development programs (including
the anthropologists who often simultaneously work as both
researchers and consultants to said programs) are all impli-
cated in this racial project. It is not a surprise, therefore,
that “international development” workers are overwhelm-
ingly white, the dominant racialized group from the Global
North, whose significance depends largely on the symbolic
and material value of whiteness. Significantly, this white-
ness is often invoked in the language of development, where
the general belief in Africa’s lack comes with the call for
outside—and specifically non-African—intervention.
THE RACIAL LEXICON OF DEVELOPMENT
Compare the following with the quoted dialogue of the
Norwegian documentary at the beginning of the article:
The extractives sector provides huge opportunities for sustainable
development and poverty reduction if properly managedwith the right
mix of policies and enforcement systems in place.
–Lebogang Motlana, director of UNDP’s Addis
Ababa–based Regional Service Center for Africa,
in 2014 (emphasis added)
[We are trying] to rectify some of the initial problems that have
continued to plague the management of the continent’s natural re-
sources. At the fore of this endeavor is the capacity of governments to
get the best deals for their countries during contract negotiations.
–Carlos Lopes, executive secretary of the UN
EconomicCommission forAfrica (emphasis added)
The “oil curse” is a shorthand expression that denotes a series of
dysfunctions—economic, political, governmental, and security—
African oil states are postcolonial states, already fragile, that have
been weakened by the corrupting influences of oil money, with their
leaders reduced to kleptocrats, their civilian regimes transformed
into brutal police states, and aggravating a regional tendency of military
rule . . . personal despotisms and veritable reigns of terror . . . . Torn
by violent conflicts . . . and internalized inferiority complexes, the
people who live in these oil-rich countries are prone to rebellion,
insurrection, and civil war.
–Douglas Yates (2012; emphasis added)
A cursory review of the vast literature on resource
extraction reveals an astonishing consistency in semantic
normativity. Scholarly, journalistic, and nongovernmental
writing on resource extraction in Africa is replete with
these particular descriptions that disparage African states
and African people. Regardless of political orientation, most
discussions are framed through the theory of the resource
curse, which assumes that the presence of resources alone,
not their exploitation, is the problem, and that avoiding this
“curse” means robust management of said resources, follow-
ing certain protocols. Thatmost countries accused of turning
resource wealth into a resource curse are former colonies
(mostly in Africa and South America) with long histories of
foreign resource exploitation does not impact analysis that
places the curse solely on “bad” local management. This is
where we see what DiMuzio (2010, 95) calls the “latent im-
perialism” of the resource curse narrative. Indeed, it seems
that the true resource curse is that “the Global South is the
victim of the fossil fuel fed capitalism of the Global North.”
The vast resource curse scholarship and related set of de-
velopment practices on the ground have not only hidden
the devastating structural legacies of colonial exploitation
but have also managed to sediment claims of African in-
competence (Obi 2010). For, the questions are not even
about industrialized nations’ addiction to fossil fuels, about
Europeans’ very right to secure resources from the African
continent, about the structural relationships that maintain
capitalist exploitation, or about whether neoliberal capital-
ism is inevitable. Instead, in a postcolonial context, they are
about Africans’ inability to make its resources available for
exploitation.
The following analysis will center on the three develop-
ment terms I described above: “good governance” (and its
corollary, “corruption”), “capacity building” (and its corol-
lary, “sustainable development”), and the descriptor “arti-
sanal” for discussing local forms of extraction. While this
is a small number within a broad and popular terminology,
I demonstrate the ways that these terms reflect politics,
ideologies, and epistemologies indexed to what Grovogui
(2001, 203) calls a “hermeneutics of race”—a sedimented
hierarchy of values organized on the basis of presumed on-
tologies of racial difference.
Good Governance
From the World Bank to the United Nations to the African
Union to academia, “good governance” is considered neces-
sary for African nations to end poverty, increase democracy,
and properly develop. “Countries with strong institutions
prosper by creating an environment that facilitates private
sector growth, reduces poverty,” claims the World Bank
group the InternationalDevelopmentAssociation.8 This sen-
timent is repeated by other Western organizations working
in Africa. Thus, the United Nations Economic Commission
for Africa states as its policy focus and advisory services: “to
assist member States in improving economic governance and
development management including strengthening the rule
of law, state legitimacy, trust in governance institutions and
reducing corruption.”9
South African scholar Thandike Mkandawire (2007,
679) explains that the “belief that lack of ‘good gover-
nance’ might be the main hindrance to economic growth
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in Africa” actually emerged in 1989 following a World Bank
report that declared, “Underlying the litany of Africa’s de-
velopment problems in a crisis of governance.”10 But this
particular declaration was actually a repurposing—and an
outright rejection—of the concerns of African scholars and
practitioners associated with the World Bank. According
to Mkandawire (2007, 680), the World Bank for the first
time consulted African scholars and commissioned back-
ground papers for their 1989 report. In their papers, the
African scholars insisted “on the importance of local initia-
tives, political accountability to the citizens, and the need
to reconcile African traditions and institutions with ‘mod-
ern’ ones.” This was an explicit effort to combat the for-
eign imposition of policies by unelected institutions (with
the hope that it would ultimately provide little need for the
World Bank).World Bank technocrats—sowedded to their
“macroeconomic fundamentals” that paid very little attention
to the cultural and sociopolitical predicaments of postcolo-
nial African states—downplayed the African scholars’ sug-
gestions. But they retained the concept of good governance.
The organization’s economists insisted on the soundness of
their conservative economic policies. When such policies
failed, presumed African institutional weakness—the lack
of capacity or will to properly implement orthodox eco-
nomic policies—was presented as the main culprit. It did
not matter, for instance, that these same policies (such as
structural adjustment) demanded a minimalist role for the
African state. This approach—linking foreign-imposed eco-
nomic policy to good governance—was radically different
from the intervention attempted by African scholars at the
World Bank. Nowadays, it would seem that few contem-
porary scholars link the ubiquitous call for African good
governance with the failure of neoliberal policies imposed
on these governments by the Bretton Woods Institutions.
To do so would challenge good-governance orthodoxy and
point to an epistemological problem: when “government
failure” in Africa is presented as more insidious than “mar-
ket failure” (Mkandawire 2001) and when the goodness of
Western development aid is taken for granted.
It is not an exaggeration to say that the state is the
most demonized institution in contemporary Western rep-
resentation of African politics. It is castigated for its weak
institutions, its size (especially its civil service), its incapacity
to discharge normal functions, its inability (and presumed
unwillingness) to drive forward development, and its overall
illegitimacy. There ismuch to be said here about the long his-
tory of the idea of African “fragile states” (Osaghae 2007),11
but I want to focus briefly on the ways that the call for good
governance and the related castigation of the African state
depend on deeply racialized views of Africa and Africans.
Scholars should be troubled by the particular language of
disdain, disappointment, and dismissal with which African
politics is often described, and the continued proliferation of
racialized epithets used to describe what has become an es-
sentialized “African state” in the anthropological (and social
science) literature: kleptocratic state, failed state, zombie
state, vampire state, predatory state, parasitic state (Mkan-
dawire 2001; Wilson 2012).12 There is a way that the terms
of engagement with African phenomena work to mask “the
deeper question of Western representations of Africa as a
continent of absolute horror, a theatre of primordial sav-
agery” (Amselle 2003, 2), terms that serve to exceptionalize
Africa and separate its experiences from the continent’s long
history of unequal and exploitative experiences with colonial
control, global capitalism, and neocolonialism.
At the heart of this demand for good governance in
Africa is the discourse of corruption. “Corruption is endemic
to Africa,” a US-based Ghanaian academic told me last year
when defending the “anemic revenues” (Panford 2017, 129)
that Ghana receives from its new oil exploration venture.13
The ultimate consensus for many Western donor states, aid
workers, and academics is that corruption is a fundamental
cultural characteristic of continental Africans. This view of
Africa does not divergemuch from the centuries-long under-
standing of African difference as so acute and its phenomena
as so exceptional as to set Africans apart from other humans
(Mudimbe 1988). In this context, the description of corrup-
tion in Africa presents the practice as an almost biological
trait, “grounded in the supposed proclivities of its rulers and
their acolytes and kin to bring chaos . . . through economic
mismanagement and embezzlement” (Grovogui 2001, 428).
Indeed, late twentieth- and early twenty-first-century spe-
cialists in African politics and culture have so focused on cor-
ruption as a fundamental cultural characteristic of theAfrican
that it has led some to wonder if corruption “is not the ‘new
racial stereotype’ for Africans” (De Figuereido 2005; cited in
Pierre 2006). This characterization works not only to deny
the universality of corruption but also to limit corruption
to the Global South, and especially Africa, while excluding
the West, foreign private corporate interests, donor gov-
ernments and financial institutions, and international NGOs
from its scope (Wilson 2012).14 Indeed, even when there
are numerous reports of Western corporations’ fraudulent
behavior, such as reneging on tax and rent payments to local
governments, the development vernaculars of endemic cor-
ruption or bad governance are not systematically deployed
against the corporations or their sponsoringWestern nations
(Bracking 2009; Ndikumana and Boyce 2018).
The development language of governance and corrup-
tion redeploys well-worn essentialized notions of Africa as a
source of corruption, chaos, and indiscipline through a series
of racialized binary oppositions. Thus, “corrupt, self-seeking
African leaders on the one hand, incorruptible, accountable
and compassionate Western institutions on the other; chaos
and conflict on the one hand, order and stability on the
other; despotism on the one hand, democracy on the other”
(Wilson 2012, 136–37). It is significant, then, that claims
of unfettered corruption and calls for good governance are
directed more often than not toward Africans. Moreover,
democratization and good governance are presented as rel-
evant within countries, but, importantly, not in the political
relations between weak and strong countries. Consequently,
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calls for good governance work to not only establish non-
Africans (usually the structurally white technocrats) as the
depository of technical know-how and capacity-producing
skills but also the group with the moral imperative to deter-
mine the social, economic, and political agendas for African
people. The relations of “trusteeship” between African na-
tions and institutions such as USAID, the World Bank, and,
more recently, the US military mammoth that is AFRICOM
are then justified. We might ask, then, what epistemologi-
cal and theoretical work would it take to deploy the values
and assumptions that underpin the good-governance lan-
guage and apply it instead to the neoliberal and neocolonial
imperialist relations between Africans and Western institu-
tions, includingWestern financial institutions, multinational
corporations, and, importantly, theWestern intellectual ap-
paratus?
In my ongoing research on the history of resource ex-
traction in Ghana, I have been particularly concerned with
the naturalization of both the practices of unequal political
and economic arrangements and the differential governance
regimes for local communities and Western corporations.
Take the following example. In late February 2015, there
was an “incident” offshore between a Tullow Oil security
vessel, the Seacor Merchant, and a fishing boat with three
Ghanaian fishermen on board. Tullow Oil Ghana Ltd. is
a private Anglo-Irish exploration and production company
that is the lead operator of the offshore Jubilee oil field off
the western coast of Ghana, near the twin cities Sekondi-
Takoradi.15 With headquarters in London, Tullow holds the
largest share of Ghana’s oil output in this field, where pro-
duction first began in December 2010. Information about
this incident came to the Ghanaian news media through a
statement from Tullow’s public relations firm that “a canoe
had deployed finishing nets very close to the FPSO Kwame
Nkrumah posing danger to its occupants, personnel in and
around the FPSO as well as sub-sea infrastructure.”16 In re-
sponse, Tullow’s security vessel used a long-range acoustic
device to demand that the fishermen haul back their nets,
purportedly to “avert danger to their lives.” The fishermen
apparently refused and continued deploying their nets to fish.
Tullow security stated that it was forced to intervene, and it
began to forcefully haul back the fishermen’s nets to remove
them from the established “security zone.” Tullow’s opera-
tives then said that the Ghanaian fishermen “rammed their
canoe” into the extremely large security vessel, damaging the
canoe in the process. The report continues: “Subsequently,
the crew of the Seacor Merchant observed that the canoe
was sinking. The fishermen were rescued and taken aboard
the Seacor Merchant. There were no injuries on either side
and both personnel and equipment in and around the Jubilee
Field are safe and secure.”
The local fishermen were eventually handed over to
Ghana police.
In many ways, this story is not remarkable. Given
the ongoing reports of local fishing-community grievances,
these “incidents” probably occur more often than we know
(Ackah-Baidoo 2013). In Ghana, Tullow’s offshore opera-
tions are a no-go zone, even for most Ghanaian government
officials. For its operations, Tullow and other private oil
companies renovated the existing structures at the Ghana
air and naval bases in Sekondi-Takoradi,17 tarring roads and
repairing buildings. Hence, structures that were originally
used for the Ghanaian military are now providing office
and logistics space for oil companies—while the Ghanaian
air force and navy provide full-time security for both oil
management and oil assets (Chalfin 2019). Tullow’s private
security trawler that confronted the Ghanaian fishermen also
had on board members of the Ghanaian navy.
Thus, there was no question that Tullow’s private se-
curity was fully within its rights in intercepting the Ghana-
ian fishermen—as fully granted both by the quasi-sovereign
Ghanaian nation-state under the tutelage of its foreign advis-
ers and consultants, and its structural location as a Western-
backed private corporation. In contrast, the Ghanaian fish-
ermen had (and have) no rights—offshore or onshore—that
the private corporation has to acknowledge. That this un-
equal confrontation between the Ghanaian fishing boat and
the Tullow security vessel occurred under unequal power
relations is understood and accepted to be the consequence
(intentional or otherwise) of the resource-extraction system
under contemporary neoliberal regimes.
The juridico-political terms and related social structures
that uphold Tullow’s extractive efforts (as well as those of
other private and multinational corporations) are by now
well known, for they follow the general political-economic
trends in the offshore oil industry. These companies’ eco-
nomic investments are ensured through an expansive ed-
ifice that entails what Walter Rodney (1972) once called
“resource-extraction zones.” These companies import all
their equipment, hire very few “locals” among their skilled
laborers, and provide their own additional private security.
Tullow’s operations “onshore” are curated through two sec-
tors: the Ghanaian military and third-party Western-backed
private and multinational logistics corporations, on the one
hand, and local, small-scale (Ghanaian-owned) industries
that provide basic and usually domestic services (such as
catering, housekeeping, and providing drivers) to the “on-
shore” foreign transient staff of these large firms, on the
other hand (Chalfin 2015).18
Tullow operations are also read through a different
moral-ethical framework that is out of reach for the Ghana-
ian state and Ghanaian people. For example, when I was in
Takoradi between 2012 and 2013, it was rumored among
a number of people in the industry that the gauge used to
measure the amount of extracted oil on Tullow’s rig had
been broken for more than eight months before some mem-
bers of the Ghanaian government were notified. The truth
of the rumor is less important than the reality that, even
if it was true, Tullow (and its sponsoring Western nations)
was not subject to moral-ethical judgments and essentializ-
ing claims of corruption and bad governance. In conducting
this research, I have been struck by the ways scholarship
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on extraction often bypass these unequal economic and po-
litical realities of minimal rents, royalties, and taxation for
these corporations to detail instead African states’ inability
to “manage” these royalties. Many of these analyses inhabit
the ideological apparatus that governs the neoliberal tropes
of African lack of good governance and that often ratify the
calls for capacity building forAfricans. The identifiable actors
within these tropes (the “corrupt” government official, the
local elite, the violent “ethnic” clashes over resources—all
racialized tropes) are treated with more ethnographic detail
and scrutiny and dispensation than the documented illicit
practices of corporate capital flight—and capital flight as a
normal practice of neocolonial imperialism.
In addition to the reality that, in the postcolonial mo-
ment, corporate rule continues to be an extension of im-
perialism, there are also the politics that emerge from the
development complex’s NGO-ization of resource extrac-
tion and, along with it, the ideological and practical merging
of NGO and corporate ideologies. In their recent article
“The Anthropology of Extraction,”19 Gilberthorpe and Ra-
jak (2017, 197–98) write of the “rapidly emerging regime”
that brings together international NGOs with a coalition of
corporations to target Global South governments’ “misman-
agement of resources and revenues.” This coalition is said to
extend its “collective guardianship . . . aimed at ensuring
accountability” for “sustainable development.” But this new
so-called global ethical regime is actually not new. Over
a decade ago, activists from all over the world critiqued
the growing “nonprofit industrial complex” as the “institu-
tionalization of a relation of dominance” (Rodr´ıguez 2009,
39). International NGOs, in other words, do not change
the prevailing power relations that place African states at
the bottom of the global economic order and its popula-
tions at the bottom of the global division of labor. Because
of the hierarchical relations of international NGOs to the
local African populations they serve, it is important to note,
there is a way that funding a presumed African “lack” works
to reinforce said lack. It is also important to recognize how
these hierarchical relationships translate into racial meanings
and ethics mapped onto people. Thus, the parallel effects on
the ground of the convergence of the ideological precepts
of NGOs and corporations are reflected in clear ways: the
corporation is read as representatives of theWest and, there-
fore, as developed, guiltless, and white. On the other hand,
Africans, representatives of the nation-state and local com-
munities, are seen as underdeveloped, Black, needy, and
lacking guidance. As a racial vernacular of development,
“good governance” depends on a presumption of state fail-
ure that retains the structuring imperial logic of a hierarchy
of ontologies. Though without the explicit language of race,
this vernacular continues to index African state failure as
a process that is “proliferous and dramatic and, like the
eighteenth-century discourse of racial anatomy, is ‘rife with
mechanistic metaphors’ . . . with states slipping backwards,
sliding toward the abyss of collapse, tottering on the brink,
before decaying, collapsing, or imploding” (Jones 2013, 61).
Capacity Building
On a bright summer afternoon in 2013, I went to meet
with some of the project leaders of an internationally funded
local NGO in Sekondi-Takoradi, in the Western Region
of Ghana. We met at the organization’s comfortably fur-
nished main office, headquartered in a spacious building in a
lush park. I had arrived in Takoradi from Accra only a few
days earlier and was staying in the nearby fishing town of
Busua. My time in Busua was marked by the seemingly un-
ending conversations about the changes impacting the local
fishing industry since offshore oil drilling operations began.
There was the complaint by some in the area about the in-
creasing difficulty fishermen faced. In particular, fishermen
were having to travel further out for better catches and,
therefore, having to be away on the ocean for days at a
time.20
My conversation that day with representatives of the
local NGO centered primarily on their numerous pro-
grammatic efforts to combat the potential devastation of
oil production on the community. This organization claims
as its goal to help local fishing communities participate in
the decision-making processes that impact their livelihoods.
There is specific concern about the social impacts associ-
ated with this new deep-sea oil drilling enterprise—from
a rise in housing and commodity prices in Takoradi and
government-enabled land grabs by foreign corporations to
boating accidents caused by the high traffic on the sea because
of the increase in supply vessels to the oil rigs. At the same
time, the NGO’s programming—mitigating the effects of
“illegal” fishing by the local population—reflected its limited
purview.
Consider some of the organization’s projects: “Citizen
Petroleum Revenue Management,” “Promoting Social Ac-
countability,” “Safe Fishing Saves Lives,” “Sustainable Fish-
eries Management,” and ensuring that there is “Enforcement
of Fisheries Laws to Enhance Governance.” These projects
deploy the accepted vernacular of development. They also
demonstrate the merging of NGO and corporate orientation
to the governance of resource extraction. In the context of
continuing revision of national laws governing oil production
predicated on primary protections for property and invest-
ment rights (what Leonard and Grovogui [2017] call a “ne-
oliberal form of the rule of law”), it is clear that governance
structures for local inhabitants are different from those of
private corporations. Indeed, governance regimes for local
populations are enacted on a differentmoral-ethical register.
Local communities in these affected areas of the oil indus-
try are “viewed as less sovereign, less industrious, and thus
less deserving of moral consideration than industry, capital,
and agreeable state officials” (Grovogui and Leonard 2007,
42). Simultaneously, foreign (non-African) technocrats and
corporate executives operate with seemingly much broader
moral latitude. Hence, the call for capacity building from
the outside.
Capacity building is another of those ubiquitous terms
within the racial vernacular of development. It depends on
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the assumption that there are local cultural or political ob-
stacles that hinder development. In theory, capacity building
can generally apply to a wide variety of groups, from non-
profit organizations to businesses that need to enhance their
organization’s abilities to better achieve results. In prac-
tice, however, capacity building is mostly associated with its
deployment in reference to aid-receiving (Southern) govern-
ments, where it is understood as the core approach to devel-
opment. Thus, for the more prominentWestern foreign-aid
organizations and financial agencies working in the Global
South, capacity building is one of the key components of
development-aid packages and programs.
The focus on building capacity emerged within a sim-
ilar context of that of good governance. Deborah Eade
(1997) contends that before the concept became a leading
term within the development terminology, capacity build-
ing came in the form of new philosophies of leftist scholars
and clergy (particularly liberation theologians and activist
feminists in Latin America) that promoted empowerment
and participation of local communities. In the early con-
text of Western-based aid and development projects, these
groups argued that development needed to be participa-
tory. Yet, in the wake of the economic crisis in Africa en-
gendered by structural-adjustment policies imposed by the
Bretton Woods Institutions, technocrats shifted the focus
from economics to also include the “social dimensions of
life in Africa, how they change, and whether all groups in
society participate effectively in the process of economic
development” (Jaycox 1991, iii). Again, the enforced ne-
oliberal economic prescriptions on Africa were not often
seen as the primary problem for development. The problem
was, instead, African social and cultural behavior. Studies
and reports were commissioned to understand these soci-
eties’ vulnerabilities and (in)capacity to properly develop.
Capacity building came to refer to “strengthening the skills,
competencies and abilities of people and communities in de-
veloping societies so they can overcome the cause of their
exclusion and suffering.”21 By its very nature, development
became theway to increase capacity. In otherwords, capacity
building “transforms helping into a technical fix, generating its
own entourage of ‘experts’” (Corwall 2007, 473). Because
the African state was already considered incapable of en-
abling development and because even political liberals with
good intentions generally “hold the west to be latently and
teleologically moderate across time and space” (Grovogui
2001, 440), donor agencies turned to their own (Western)
NGOs to lead this move, enabling the structural usurpation
of the power of African states and African peoples.
Capacity building is now considered a key form of de-
velopment assistance, occurring primarily through foreign
NGOs, which work as contractors, to help implement the
policies ofWestern donors. The perceived need for technol-
ogy and skills transfer to an ignorant and less-technology-
savvy local population drives most capacity-development
agendas (Crewe and Harrison 1999). The logic of capacity
building as indirect “aid” is directly related to the presumed
inability of African states to properly govern. Thus, inter-
national donors, such as the US Agency for International
Development (USAID), provide aid in the form of human
“expertise” such that states can develop the proper abilities
and skills. As a result, we often hear that capacity building
refers to improvements to the governance and institutional
capacities of resource-rich poor countries so that they can im-
plement and enforce their laws (as exemplified above with
the local NGO’s mandate of helping Ghanaian fishermen
manage the negative effects of neoliberal, corporate-friendly
laws and practices).
The concept of capacity building (and its ideologies and
practices) is effective and potent because it is cast as tech-
nical and rational. Yet, in its mesmerizing repetitions, ca-
pacity building also depends on the ideological and political
construction of the incapacity of African countries—that is,
cultural, developmental, and civilizational lack.While there
may be some truth to Ghana’s need for more skilled workers
in the new oil industry, for example, the capacity-building
mantra also emerges from within the broader ideological
and political construction of a terminology that accompa-
nied the colonizing practices for the production and man-
agement of a Third World, of a needy Africa, for capital. As
deployed, capacity building indexes “the often unacknowl-
edged . . . assumption of white superiority and expertise”
(Kothari 2006, 15) and points to a set of practices where
there is clearly a racialized distinction “not only betweenwho
is developed and underdeveloped, but who gives assistance
and who must be grateful for it” (14). This raises the ques-
tion, asked by Grovogui: How is it that “certain people and
places (the west) came to exemplify cultural adaptability,
political competency and modernity while other people in
other places (the third world) became the symbol of cultural
inflexibility, political dysfunction and underdevelopment”
(cited in Kothari 2006, 11)?
Gustavo Esteva (2010) argues that development has a
double function. For those considered already developed,
their self-perception depends on a conceit of progress, char-
ity, and the insistence of imposing its systems on those be-
low. But for the majority of the world—the so-called Third
World—development requires a self-perception as under-
developed, “with the whole burden of connotation that this
carries” (Esteva 2010, 3; see also Escobar 1995). Because
many people in these societies accept the status of under-
development, it undermines self-confidence and “clamours
for management from the top down” (Esteva 2010, 3). It
is not surprising that local communities have also adopted
this racialized vernacular of development. At the same time,
while the structural conditions underpinning development
projects—from funding to staffing—drastically restrict lo-
cal agency, the adoption of the vernacular of development
also reflects a form of local agency. As Omolade Adunbi
(2015, 243) demonstrates in his study of activism in the
Niger Delta, foreign-funded local NGOs adopt the terms
that are necessary for continuing funding. Nevertheless, this
local agency is also contradictory because it reinforces—by
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adopting development’s terms of engagement—the strength
of the racialized vernacular of development and its related
practices.
Artisanal (as Descriptor)
Within the extractive industries—whether oil or gold—the
descriptor “artisanal” seems to have taken a life of its own.
According to political scientist Paula Butler (2015), the sub-
ject “artisanal miner” or “small-scale miner or fisherman”
has been actively produced in the dominant discourse of
large international development agencies since the 1990s.
Within mining, government, and development discourse,
“artisanal mining” usually refers to mining that is carried out
informally, often without a mining license or the payment
of fees, and, importantly, that bypasses environmental reg-
ulations. In places such as Ghana, small-scale gold mining
was decriminalized in 1989 (almost one hundred years after
Indigenous mining was made illegal by the British colonial
government) to combat increasing poverty in the context
of structural adjustment and the subsequent growth of cor-
porate mining activities in the country. Of late, however,
much focus has turned to such problems associated with ar-
tisanal mining. In particular, there is the problem of illegal
mining (dubbed galamsey in Ghana), which is believed to be
the primary cause of environmental degradation and com-
munity destabilization. Indeed, environmental concerns and
the rise in crime were the reasons given for the Ghanaian
government’s recent one-and-half-year ban on small-scale
mining. This is even as some critics have pointed out that
the “surface mining” of large corporations contributes much
more to environmental degradation (Tsuma 2010). While
for Ghana, in particular, the focus is on illegal foreign small-
scale mining, artisanal mining is one of the general concerns
for the development industry.
Notably “artisanal” industries are contrasted to corpo-
rate, capital-intensive, foreign, and white-owned compa-
nies. For example,within the goldmining industry inGhana,
the fight against galamsey has centered on the uncouth but
well-connected local businesspeople who promote general
lawlessness.22 The discoursemechanism here is important. It
works in twoways. In thefirst instance, thosewhoparticipate
in galamsey are unruly, illegal, and anarchic. But simultane-
ously, the galamsey are considered lacking in the necessary
skills (and equipment), are too technologically primitive, and
are therefore irresponsible and environmentally disruptive.
Indeed, in September 2018, Ghana Business News magazine
reported that theWorld Bank had released $50 million ($30
million of which are loans, the other $20 million are grants)
to support the government’s “fight against illegal mining and
the wanton degradation of the environment.”23 In its justifi-
cation for disbursing the funds, theWorld Bank unironically
stressed that it would provide capacity-building services to
help small-scale miners emulate the corporate social respon-
sibility model of community building and engagement.
Foreign-run, large-scale mining companies, however,
are rarely taken to task for practices of environmental
degradation or for corruption. But the choice of contrast
is explicitly political and covertly racial. The reality is that
so-called artisanal extraction—Indigenousmining or fishing,
among other things—pre-dates European extraction, slave
trading in Africans, and colonialism, and encompass a wide
range of practices (Howard 1978; see also Dummett 1998).
Yet the idea of “artisanal” recasts African labor practices as
diminutive and backward. In fact, the World Bank uses the
word “primitive” to describe the technology used by Indige-
nous fishermen and miners (Butler 2015). It is important to
note that while products deemed “artisan” or “artisanal” in
Europe and the United States are celebrated because they
tend to reference skilled craftworkers, the term does not
have the same connotation in reference to Africans. The
“artisanal” miner or fisherman is said to inhabit an ancient
world and to only possess rural skills not yet adapted to (or
capable of using) modern technology. The naturalizing of
“artisanal” mining is an essentializing move that renders the
African independent miner or fisherman a different kind of
being.
The three terms analyzed above, part of a broader racial
vernacular of development, have much in common. First,
they depend on the presumption of an African lack, which
is depicted as “immutable African cultural dispositions, and
distinct regional attributes,” and which account for Africans’
“physical, social, and political ills” (Grovogui 2001, 440).
Second, they make an implicit—and at times explicit—
call for external (usually Western/white) intervention in
African affairs. Because the African lack is understood as
immutable, this external intervention has to be indefinite.
Third, this terminology represents ideas and practices that
are seen as unique to Africans (and, more generally, the
Global South).The racialized vernaculars of development are
not only based on ideologies and practices that presume the
inherent inadequacies of the postcolonial African state and
of African peoples, inadequacies that blame African cultural
practices alone for so-called underdevelopment (Grovogui
2001). Ultimately, the vernaculars also work within the
context of global white supremacy, for it is not possible
to compare “African and European agencies and cultural
dispositions without conflating them with racial creatures
and habits” (Kothari 2006, 13).
CONCLUSION
The ideological precepts and racialized political-economic
relations revealed through the contemporary extraction in-
dustry inAfrica are not new. Indeed, itwas under colonialism
that “capitalist imperialism” became a permanent stimulus
for the racialized “ordering of unequal and exploitative re-
lations production . . . and further demanded justification
of these relations” (Magubane 1979, 3). While the develop-
ment industry emerged from this history of racial capitalism,
a history that shapes the routine inequality related to resource
appropriation and imperial control (Hudson 2017), this re-
ality and its clear material consequences are often obscured
in the scholarship—including the work that critiques the
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industry. This is a way that the racialized structural violence
of the development industry continues to be rendered ratio-
nalized, routine, and commonsense. AnthropologistMichel-
Rolph Trouillot (1989, 714–15) once remarked that, as a
discipline “concernedwith the left-overs of colonialism,” an-
thropology inherits part of its “terminological package” but
has yet to complete the task of the “systematic historicization
of the very categories we use.”
Here is a brief example. In an otherwise interesting
article about the uneasy “politics of dependence” emerging
among a South African community dealing with late capi-
talism and where people’s labor is of diminishing value, the
author writes that a young scholar’s PhD research “showed
that well-intentioned projects to build norms of democratic citizen-
ship in KwaZulu-Natal ran afoul of entrenched local expectations
about hierarchical leadership, and a stubborn (and, to the
emancipatory liberal mind, scandalous) attachment to personal-
istic and decidedly undemocratic authority of chiefs” (Ferguson
2013, 232; emphasis added). Here, we get the sedimenta-
tion, however unwittingly, of the same language and tropes
that set up the binary structure between Africans and pre-
sumably (white) Europeans/Americans. Who is assumed to
be leading the “well-intentioned projects to build norms of
democratic citizenship”? What do we make of the seemingly
innocent reference to “entrenched local expectations”?Why
is it not problematic that the author sets himself (and his
foreign colleagues) apart as having an “emancipatory liber-
atory mind”—in direct opposition to the Southern Africans
who have a presumably irrational “attachment to personalis-
tic . . . and undemocratic authority of chiefs”? This critique
should not be reduced to a personal concernwith the scholar.
Rather, this example reflects a larger corpus of research pa-
pers, dissertations, fellowship applications, and books on
development that take for granted presumed African deficit
marked against an implicit Western goodness. Here, we see
what is assumed to be the moral centrality of theWest, what
Grovogui refers to as the “texture of abstract moral judg-
ment,” that demonstrates the ways that even “liberal notions
of justice and morality have a racial tincture” (Agathangelou
2016, 211).
Within the development terminology (as well as aca-
demic discussions of development), notions of racial dif-
ference may be submerged, but they are not far from the
surface. This racial vernacular—and the practices that it
supports—serves as a supplement both to discourses and
representations of charity and philanthropy, linked to Eu-
ropean and US whiteness and to discussions and “pictures
of poor, black tribal . . . wasteland[s] of limited resources”
(Kothari 2006, 13). It is often a moral imperative that de-
pends on a consistent liberal dehumanization of Africans.
What I mean here is the deployment of a system of liberal
ideologies through language that assumes the goodness of
European liberal configurations (the rule of law, inalienable
rights)—configurations that structure postcolonial African
states’ unequal relationship to the rest of the world. As
Grovogui (1996) demonstrates in Sovereigns, Quasi-Sovereigns,
and Africans, these liberal principles were actually violated
through the colonial project and decolonization, operat-
ing as racializing practices for Africans while simultaneously
concealing and justifying the violence of white European po-
litical and cultural dominance (see also Mills 2017). Thus,
if the development terminology is not explicit in its racial-
ization, it structures this racialization in its implications of
African difference and the subsequent normalization of such
implications.
In themain, the scholarshipwithin the development field
continues to demonstrate the ways that, to quote Faye Har-
rison (1991, 3), “the connotations of a racialized Other . . .
have been and, unfortunately, still remain underpinnings
of many anthropological assumptions and perspectives.” A
cursory review on the output of anthropological research
on development or resource-to-development schemes will
show that, with exceptions, the starting point for such work
actually begins with two interrelated assumptions: (1) the
assumption, with caveats, of the overall goodness of West-
ern institutions and aid projects, and how certain Western
ideals of democracy are sacrosanct; and (2) the assumption
of the cultural, civilization, and racial binary oppositions
between Africans and the rest. These assumptions are em-
bedded in the structure of global white supremacy. The
racial lexicon of development is its discursive expression.
Terms such as “resource curse,” “good governance,” “cor-
ruption,” “capacity building”—as well as descriptors like
“artisanal”—are “historical products, shaped by the past and
present they claim to describe and analyze” (Trouillot 1989,
714).
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1. See: https://lemonhound.com/2017/12/12/m-nourbese-
philip-interview-with-an-empire/.
2. The five-year OfD agreements have been signed and renewed
over the years, with the latest one set to end in 2019.
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3. See: https://youtu.be/01quNL3VRHI.
4. See: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/WBEUROPEEXTN/
Resources/268436-1322648428296/8288771-1326107592690/
8357099-1349433248176/Concept_Note_Trust_Fund_
Proposal.pdf.
5. The popular “resource curse” theory states that a country en-
dowed with natural resources will be cursed to bad economic
management and ultimate poverty (Yohannes 2010). I discuss
this “curse” later in the article.
6. To be clear, this new scholarship does not come out of anthro-
pology; it comes from critical development studies and mostly
from scholars based outside of the United States.
7. I am aware that the distinction of “Global North” and “Global
South” are also problematic and set up a binary that continues
to reinforce racialized and unequal distinctions. I use the terms
here provisionally (and reluctantly).
8. See: http://ida.worldbank.org/theme/governance-and-
institutions.
9. See: https://www.uneca.org/pages/about-governance. See
Grovogui (1996) for a discussion on the deployment of “rule
of law” as a racializing trope.
10. It must be noted here that these policy statements often refer
to “Africa” without specificity. The fact that each nation-state
within the continent has its specific economic history and set of
policies seems to matter little. This kind of flattening and gen-
eralizing about “Africa” or “African States” further demonstrates
the ways that this language depends upon particular racial logics.
11. See Kiely (1998) and Mkandawire (2001) for important dis-
cussions of the World Bank’s differential deployment of “good
governance” discourse for African states versus East Asian ones.
12. See Mkandawire (2001) for a searing critique of the evolving
and discriminatory views of the “African state.”
13. Researchers argue that Ghana provides some of the most at-
tractive financial terms for foreign oil companies (see Phillips,
Hailwood, and Brooks 2016). See also Panford (2017) for dis-
cussions of the extraordinary terms of Ghana’s oil contracts,
where operators at Jubilee Field (the name of the site of Ghana’s
offshore oil rigs) pay only a 5 percent royalty rate.
14. Compare this to actual occurrences of egregious cases of West-
ern corruption—the capital theft of multination corporations,
Enron, banking failure, Donald Trump, and US politics, etc.—
and how they are not described as “natural” or “essential” tenden-
cies of the people of theWest. Each case is read as an exception.
15. Ghana signed a petroleum exploration agreement with Kos-
mos Energy in 2004, a small oil-exploration company based in
Texas. Kosmos had US equity financing and, in 2007, found
considerable oil deposits in the offshore Tano Basin. The oil
field is named “Jubilee Field,” as it was found in 2007, the
year of Ghana’s fiftieth anniversary. Tullow Oil, an Anglo-Irish
oil and gas exploration firm, developed the fields. Most recent
data shows that the oil companies that operate Jubilee Field
are Tullow Oil, with stakes of 35.8 percent; Kosmos energy,
24 percent; Anadarko, 23.4 percent; Ghana National
Petroleum Company (GNPC), 10 percent; E & O (a private
Ghanaian company), 3.5 percent; and Sabre Oil, 1.85 percent
(Panford 2017)
16. FPSO is an acronym for Floating Production Storage and Of-
floading. It’s an offshore floating vessel used by the oil and gas
industry for the production and storage of oil. This one, ironi-
cally named after first president Kwame Nkrumah, operates in
Ghana’s first offshore oil fields, the Jubilee.
17. These included the Takoradi Air Force Station, the Sekondi
Naval Base, and the Takoradi Port.
18. See Chalfin (2015), for an important discussion of the interde-
pendent relationship between the “offshore” and “onshore” of oil
production. It is also important to stress the racial economy of
this oil production in Africa and other resource-producing (i.e.,
“developing”) areas: there is a clear division of labor that maps
onto racial distinctions, distinctions that replicate the working
of monopolies in Ghana during formal colonialism (Pierre 2013;
see also Appel 2012).
19. This is an important review essay that is tellingly—
and unfortunately—framed through the trope of the “resource
curse.”
20. See: http://www.reportingoilandgas.org/wp-content/
uploads/impact-of-oil-and-gas-exploration-on-fisheries.pdf.
21. See: http://www.spadeglobal.org/what-we-do/capacity-
building/.
22. Over the past decade, the galamsey phenomenon has implicated
Chinese speculators, who are often said to be using Ghanaian
front people.
23. See: https://www.ghanabusinessnews.com/2018/09/05/
world-bank-to-support-ghana-with-50million-in-the-fight-
against-galamsey-country-director/.
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